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How did industrial structure and performance  First, in industries for which protection was
change after Chile's dramatic trade liberaliza-  lifted, the smallest plants tended to expand
tion?  output more. Cross-plant estimates of retlims to
scale dropped significantly. These findings are
A comparison of the 1967 and 1979 censuses  consistent with the view that exposure to foreign
shows little improvement in productivity overall  competition forces suboptimally small producers
- but these figures don't separate the effects of  toward minimally efficient scale.
trade liberalization from the effects of recession,
high interest rates, and real appreciation.  Second, production levels became higher
and more uniform across plants in those indus-
To isolate the effects of trade liberalization,  tries undergoing dramatic reductions in protec-
Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo compared industries  tion.
in which protection was significantly reduced
with industries in which it was not.  Several  Taken together, these results support the
findings emerged.  received wisdom that increased exposure to trade
improves competition within an industry.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work undcr way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
AffairsComplex. An objective oftheseries is to get these findings outquickly. even if presentations are less than fullypolished.
The findings, interpretations, and conch:-ions in thcse papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced bv the PRE Dissemination CenterTable  of  Contents
I.  Overview  1
II.  A Glance  at the  Data  2
A.  Changes  in the  Chilean  Economy  Between
the  Census  Years  2
B.  Industry-wide  Changes  in Structure  3
C.  Sector-Specific  Structural  Change  6
III.  Better  Measures  of Efficiency  Changes  11
A.  Indices  of Scale  and  Technical  Efficiency  11
B.  Dealing  with  Imperfect  Data  15
C.  The  Estimated  Effect  of Trade  Reform  on
Productive  Efficiency  17
IV.  Conclusion  Remarks  23
Appendix  1:  Production  Technolgoy  Estimates  24
Bibliography  30
Appendix  2:  Data  Preparation  Procedures  32
Bibliography  44
List  of Tables
Table  1  Aggregate  Industrial  Structure.  1967  and  1979  4
Table  2  Cross-Industry  Rank  Correlations  --  Changes  in
Protection  with  Changes  in  Industrial  Characteristics  9
Table  3  Values  and  Rank  Correlations  of Protec,  Scale,
Effic  and  Disper  19
Figure
Figure  1  Efficiency  Inferences  from  Technology  Estimates  13
This  paper  was  prepared  for  the  World  Bank  research  project  "The  Effects  of
Trade  Regimes  on Industrial  Competition and  Efficiency"  (RPO  764-46). We
thank  Raul  Galleguillos  and  Jose  Miguel  Sanchez  for  their  painstaking  work
in preparing  the  data  used in  this  study,  and  Julie  Stanton  for  very  able
research  assistance.  Helpful comments from Bela  Balassa,  Zvi  Griliches,
Gene Grossman,  Ramon  Lopez,  Cristian  Moran,  Dani  Rodrik  and  three  anonymous
referees  were received  on  an  earlier draft.1
I.  OVERVIEW
For  several  reasons, development economists  routinely  argue  that
trade  protection  reduces  industrial sector efficiency. First,  in  markets
characterized  by entry  barriers,  the  absence  of foreign  competition  allows
domestic producers  to  enjoy  monopoly  power  and  excess profits.
Consequently,  these  firms  may  fail  to  produce  at  minimum  efficient  scale
(achieve  "scale  efficiency")  and/or  to get  the  maximum  possible  output  from
their  input bundles (achieve "technical efficiency'  or 'X-efficiency").
Second, in  markets characterized  by  Chamberlinean  competition, trade
protection may  attract inefficiently  small producers, causing  similar
increases  in  average  production costs. 1 It  is sometimes  claimed  that
these two  intra-industry  effects of  protectionism  are  more important
sources  of  welfare  loss  than  the  traditional  comparative  advantage  effects.
Disturbingly,  the  body  of  empirical evidence supporting  these
claims  is ambiguous.  For  example, Rodrik  (1988a) notes  that "there  is
practically  no direct evidence on  the  importance of scale  economies  in
specific  industrial  sectors  of the  developing  countries.' Similarly,  Pack
(1988)  observes that  "to date  there  is  no  clear  confirmation  of the
hypothesis  that  countries  with an  external  orientation  benefit  from  greater
growth  in technical  efficiency  in  the  component  sectors  of  manufacturing."
Finally,  Bhagwati  (1988)  concludes  "although the  arguments  for  the  success
of the  export promotion strategy  based  on  economies of scale  and  X-
1/  For  more  detail  on  arguments involving scale  effects,  entry  and  exit,
see  Roberts  and  Tybout  (1990).  For  a compact  review  of the  literature
linking  trade  and  technical  efficiency  in  LDCs see  Rodrik  (1988b).2
efficiency  are  plausible, empirical support for  them  is  not  available.'
One is  left  wondering  whether  the  received  wisdom  is  more  a matter  of faith
than  fact.
The lack  of clear  evidence is  not  accidental.  To examine  the
intra-industry  effects  of trade  reforms  directly,  one  must  make "before  and
after'  comparisons  of a large  sample  of  plants. Sufficient  data  are  rarely
available for  the  appropriate  countries  at  the  appropriate times.
Fortuitously,  however, the  Chilean trade  liberalization  of 1974-79  was
preceded and  followed by  industrial  censuses, providing a  natural
experiment.  This  paper  is  an effort  to  document  the  evidence  that  emerged.
The  paper  is divided into  three remaining  sections. After  some
background  on  Chilean  reforms,  section II presents  descriptive  measures  of
the  size  distribution and  productivity  of  each  industry  in  each  census
year.  Changes  in these measures across census  years  are then  correlated
with industry-specific  changes  in  effective protection  rates. The  results
are suggestive,  but suffer  from conceptual  problems,  measurement  error  and
missing  data  problems. Hence  section III  corrects  for  these  shortcomings
and re-examines  patterns  of association.  The results  reinforce  and  extend
the  findings  in section  II:  Although  overall  industrial  efficiency  did  not
improve  between  the  two  census  years,  the  3-digit  industries  that  underwent
relatively  large  reductions  in  protection  improved  relative  to others.
II.  A GLANCE  AT THE  DATA
A.  Changes  in the  Chilean  Economy  Between  The  Census  Years
In this  section  we take  a  first  look  at the  data  to familiarize
the  reader  with  general  magnitudes and  sources of  variation. But  before3
discussing  descriptive  statistics,  it is worth  reviewing  the  major  changes
that took  place  in  Chile  between  the  two  census  years. 2
Like most  developing  countries,  Chile  pursued an  import-
substituting  industrialization  strategy  in the  1950s  and  1960s. By 1967  --
the  first year  for which  we  have plant-level data  --  quantitative
restrictions  (QRs) were  widespread.  The  cross-sectoral  dispersion  in
tariff  rates  was  extremely  high,  and  the  average  effective  protection  rate
for  manufacturing  was  over  100  percent (Behrman, 1976).  In addition,
market  entry  and  exit  were  limited by  extensive  controlR  on the  domestic
credit  market  and  by  labor  laws that made  worker  dismissal  difficult.
Ainally,  price  controls  on domestic  commodity  markets  were pervasive.
By 1979 --  the  other  year  for  which  we  observe plants --  the
situation  had  changed  dramatically.  All  QRs  hibd  been removed  in 1974,  and
between  1975  and  1979,  the  average effective  protection  rate  rate  had  been
brought  dowc  below  15  percent, while  cross-sectoral  dis  ion  in tariff
rates  had  been  virtually  eliminated.  Thus  by 1979,  Chile  had  achieved  one
of the lowest  and  most  uniform protection structures in the  world.  The
domestic  labor  and  financial markets had  also  been  deregulated  and  price
controls  on sales  in the  domestic  market  had  been  removed.
B.  Industry-wide  Changes  in  Structure
Table  1  summarizes the  ways  in which  industrial structure,
productivity  and  exposure  to  foreigr.  competition  changed  between  the  two
census  years. Referring  to the  top  panel,  notice  that  the  dramatic  drop  in
protection  was accompanied by  clear  increases in  import  shares,  export
2/ See  Corbo  (1985)  for  further  details.Table  1:  AGGREGATE  INDUSTRIAL  STRUCTLFRE,  1967  AND 1979
1967  1979  Ratio
(1)  (2)  (2)1(1)
Market  Conditionsa
Effective  Protection  120Z  15%  .13
Export  Share  42  132  3.25
Import  Penetration  Rate  20Z  29T  1.45
Intra-Industry  Trade  Index  .14  .28  2.00
Manufacturing  Unemp.  Rate  5Z  132  2.60
Plant  Size  Distributionb
Average  Gross  Output  per  Plant  37,241  37,425  1.01
Number  of Plants  7,060  6,771  .96
10th  output  percentile  1,430  1,051  .74
25th  output  percentile  3,006  2,358  .78
median  output  .,203  5,723  .79
75th  output  percentile  20,972  16,126  .77
9Gth  output  percentile  75,536  60,442  .80
99th  output  percentile  507,189  595,724  1.17
Factor  Use  and  Productivityb
Value  Added  per  Plant  21,403  15,978  .75
Workers  per  Plant  39  34  .88
Efficiency  Labor  per  Plantc  188  185  .98
Capital  per  Plantd  30,760  59,853 1.95
a  All figures  refer  to  manufacturing. Trade  flow  data  are  taken  from
de  Melo and  Urata  (1986).  Let  X,  M  and  Q represent  exports,
imports  and  domestic production, respectively.  Then  the  export
share  is  X/Q;  the  import penetration rate  is  M/(Q+M-X),  and  the
index  of intra-industry  trade  is  1.0  - IX-MI/(X+M).  Effective
protection  figures  are  taken  from  Behrman  (1976)  and  Aedo and  Lagos
(1979). We omit  the  glass  industry  in calculating  mean effective
protection  rates  because  its  1967 value  of  3500X  was an extreme
outlier. Unemployment figures come  from Banco  Central  de Chile
(1986).
b  These  figures  refer  to  the  census  data  after  cleaning. Variables
valued  in  1967  prices  were converted  to 1979  prices.
c  wage bill  divided  by  the  minimum wage,  which  is  held constant  in
real  terms  across  census  years.
d  figures  are  based  on  plants  reporting  complete  capital  stock  data.
Such  plants  constituted  38  percent of  the  sample  in 1967  and  35
percent  in 1979.5
shares,  and  intra-industry  trade.  So trade  liberalization  apparently  did
place  domestic  manufacturers  in  more  direct  competition  with their  foreign
rivals. Also,  however, it  combined with  macro  stabilization  policies  to
create  unemployment  problems  that  still  lingered  in 1979.
The  middle  panel  of  table  1 describes  the  plant  size  distribution.
Here  notice  that  output  per  plant  remained  surprisingly  stable  between  1967
and 1979,  while the  number  of plants  fell  slightly. This  lack  of expansion
presumably reflected the  same  forces  that  created recession and
unemployment  during  the  second  half of  the  1970s. Notice  alsc  that,  while
the  largest  plants  expanded,  most  others contracted.  So if small  plants
were below  minimum  efficient scale in  1967,  they were probably  more so
after  the  liberalization.
Measures  of  value-added per  unit  input  ive  a crude  sense  for
productivity  levels;  these  can  be  inferred from  the  bottom  panel  of table
1.  Referring  to th,  last  column,  note that  value-added  per  plant  fell  more
rapidly  than  workers  per  plant  (however  measured)  between  1967  and 1979,  so
labor  productivity  dropped. Similarly,  for  those  plants  reporting  complete
capital  stock  data, value-added  per  unit  capital  fell. 3 Taken  together,
these  results  suggest  an  unequivocal fall  in  total  factor  productivity  for
the  manufacturing  sector  as a  whole  between 1967  and  1979. Like  the low
output  growth,  this productivity  dr3p  probably reflected  the  relatively
slack  demand  for  manufactured products in  1979, coupled  with  a gradual
3/ Bear in  mind,  however,  that measurement  problems  are  particularly  acute
for  capital  stocks,  which  are  reported by only  a fraction  of the  plants
and  are  expressed  in  historic cost  deflated  by a general  capital  stock
price  index.6
change  in the  mix of  products and  the  nature  of technology. 4 Measurement
error  is  also likely,  especially  in  capital  stocks  and  x1&  price  deflators. 5
C.  Sector-Specific  Structural  Change
For several  reasons,  we  caution against viewing  th.e  patterns  of
adjustment  in table  1  as  driven exclusively, or  even  mainly,  by trade
policy. First,  as already noted, the  avail4tle  price  indices  may exhibit
general  biases  over  time, and  some of  the  variables  are  measured  with
error. Second,  and  more  importantly,  Chile  4;;derwent  many  major  policy
changes  between  1967  and  1979, including hy>,.  inflation during  1973,  a
major  recession  during  1974-76, exchange  rate  appreciation  thereafter,  and
large  increases  in  ti,e  real interest rate.  In  terms  of influence  on
manufacturing  sector  aggregates,  these  forces could  easily  have  masked  the
effects  of commercial  policy.
Comparisons  of adjustment  patterns  among  the  different  three-digit
industries  are  more likely  to  reveal something  about  the  effects  of trade
liberalization.  This  is  because  all  industries  were subject  to roughly  the
same  measurement  errors and  changes in macro  conditions,  but  different
4/  Reductions  in  the  ratio  of  industrial  value  added  to industrial  output
are  typically  observed  as  the  process  of economic  development  unfolds.
See,  for  example,  Chenery,  Syrquin,  and  Robinson  (1986).
5/  We  used  official  price  series  at  the  three-digit  indust-ial
clasificati  n level  from Chile's Instituto Nacional  de Estadastica  to
deflate  outputs,  and  combined  these prices  with the  1977  Chilean  input-
output table  to  impute  sector-specific  intermediate input price
deflators.  Experimentation with  other  price  indices did  not
signficantly  change our  findings.  Further details of  our  data
preparation  are  available  upon  request.7
industries  underwent very  different amounts of  change  in  protection.
Therefore,  deviations  of particular  industries from  the  typical  pattern  of
adjustment  probably  partly  reflected  the  amount  of new foreign  competition
that  these  irM'stries  faced.
To see  whether  changes  in  trade  exposure  correlate  with changes  in
structure and  performance,  we  construct a  set  of  industry-specific
variables. First,  we  measure the  change in  protection  between  1967  and
1979  with:
PROTEC =  (l+R  79)/(l+R  67
where  Rjt  as the  effective  protection  rate  for  the  jth .ndustry  in  year  t.6
Simildrly,  we construct  a  set  of  industry-specific  measures  of  change  in
size,  factor  use,  and  productivity.  But  for  these  variables,  we provide
extra  detail  by looking  at the  shape  of the  entire  cross-plant  distribution
in each  year --  just  as in  the  middle panel  of table  1.  For  example,  we
measure  changes  in the  size  distribution  of plants  wtih the  following  six
variables:
RQn  (l+Qn  79)/(l+Qn  67)  n =  10,  25,  50,  75,  90,  99
Here  Qn. represents  the  output  of the  plant  at the  nth  percentile  during
year t,  given  that  plants  in  this  industry and  year  have  been  sorted  in
order  of increasing  output.  So  if median plant  size  falls  between  the
census  years  for  industry  j, RQ50j will  be  less than  one. Also,  if  the
shape  of the size  distribution  changes,  this  will  be reflected  by different
values  for  the  different  percentiles.  We constuct  analogous  variables  to
6/  Estimates  of the  effective  rates  of  protection  by industry  and  year  are
taken  from  Behrman  (1977)  and  Aedo and  Lagos (1986).8
measure  changes  in  value-added (RVn), employment (RLn),  value-added  per
efficiency  unit (RVEn),  value-added  per  unit  capital  (RVKn),  gross  output
per efficiency  unit (RQEn),  and  gross  output  per  unit  capital  (RQKn). 7
We choose  these  variables  for  several reasons. First,  use  of the
ratio  form  makes  it  possible  to  ignore any  macro  shock  or data  bias  that
affects  all industries  equally. 8 It  also  allows  us to ignore  industry-
specific  effects  that  do  not  vary  over  time. Se-!ond,  by including  both
gross  output  and  value-added  in  our  set  of  variables,  we can see  whether
the  findings  hinge  critically  on  measurement  problems  with the  latter.
Different  three-digit  industries presumably react  differently  to
changes  in protection.  So,  to  avoid  forcing  all  industries  into  the  same
mold,  we use  Spearman  rank correlations to  look  for  dominant  patterns  of
association  between PROTEC and  the  various measures of  structure  and
performance. These  correlations  are  reported in  Table  2 for  each  variable
and  percentile,  along  with associated  t ratios.
Several  conclusions  can  be drawn.  First,  sectors  with relatively
large  declines  in  protection  have  shown  a somewhat  greater  tendency  toward
emplcyment  reductions.  For  example, the  correlation  between  changes  in
protection and  changes in  the  50th  employment  percentile is  .260,
indicating  that  reductions  in  protection are  associated  with reductions  in
employment  among  plants  with  no  more  than  the  median  number  of workers.
7/ Ratios  involving  capital  are  constructed  using  only  the subset  of plants
reporting  complete  capital  stock  data.
8I By 'equally,f  we  mean  that  the  shock or  bias  scales the  ratio  of
interest  by an amount  that  is independent  of j.9
Table 2:  CROSS-INDUSTRY RANK CORRELATIONS --
CHANGES IN PROTECTION  WITH CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Percentiles (n)
PROTEC correlated with:  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  99th
Gross Output  -.327  -.193  -.062  .157  .133  .108
(RQn)  (1.50) (.86)  (.26)  (.69)  (.59)  (.47)
Value Added  -.481  -.338  -.251  -.168  .003  .054
(RVAn)  (2.39) (1.56) (1.13) (0.74) (0.01)  (.23)
Employment  .251  -.055  .260  .520  .397  .251
(RLn)  (1.13)  (.25) (1.17) (2.67) (1.89) (1.13)
Efficiency .. abor  .075  -.018  .348  .395  .222  .181
(REn)  (.33)  (.08) (1.61) (1.87)  (.99)  (.80)
Value Added  -.577  -.434  -.410  -.304  -.414  -.071
per Efficiency  (3.08) (2.10) (1.96) (1.39) (1.98) (.31)
LaboL (RVAEn)
Value Added  -.392  -.246  -.199  -.323  -.236  -.221
per unit  (1.85) (1.11) (.88)  (1.48) (1.06) (.98)
Capital (RVAKn)
Gross Output per  -.451  -.418  -.462  -.319  -.516  -.022
unit Efficiency  (2.20) (2.01) (2.27) (1.47) (2.63)  (.09)
Labor (RQEn)
Gross Output per  -.218  -.143  -.158  -.414  -.419  -.358
unit Capital (RQKn)  (.96)  (.62)  (.70) (1.98) (2.01) (1.67)
Absolute values of t ratios are in parentheses
This reduction is  most striking among plants in the third largest quartile,
and is stongest  when employment is  measured in terms of number of  workers.
Second, however, reductions in  protection  are associated  with higher value
added and output among the smallest  plants.  This effect is stongest in the
lowest decile, and is nonexistent among  plants above the median.  So there10
is  some  evidence that,  as  protection falls, small plants increase
production  levels  toward minimum efficient scale, shedding  labor  at the
same  time. 9
Given  that  labor use  falls and  output  rises as  protection  is
reduced,  it is  unsurprising that value-added per  efficiency  worker  and
output  per  efficiency  worker  both  rise.  As  with the  output  effects,  these
responses  are  concentrated among  the  smaller plants. 10 This  finding
supports  X-efficiency  arguments  linking  trade  exposure  and  productivity.
Finally,  and less  strikingly,  output per  unit  capital  and  value-
added  per  unit  capital tend to  rise most  in  those  industries  where  the
reductions  in  protection  were  most  dramatic. Hence,  given  that  reductions
in  protection  are  associated  with increases  in  both  output  per  employee  and
output  per  unit  capital, any  standard index  of total  factor  productivity
growth  constructed from  these data would  probably  correlate  negatively
across  industries  with changes  in  protection.
9/  Comparing  plants'  employment levels in  Chile  (1979-1986)  and  Colombia
(1977-1987),  Roberts  and  Tybout  (forthcoming)  found  that  high  rates  of
protection  were associated  with relatively  large  plants  --  both  in terms
of output  and  in  terms  of  employment --  once  industry  and  country
effects  were  controlled for.  This  finding is  consistent  with the
present paper's findings regarding correlations  of  protection  with
workers  per  plant,  but  not  with its  findings  regarding  output  per  plant.
10/  Efficiency  effects  aside,  a reduction  in effective  protection  can  cause
an increase  in  value-added  to  the  extent  that  technology  allows  plants
to substitute  away  from intermediate  goods usage  as their  relative
price  rises. We are  grateful  to Ramon  Lopez  for  this  point.11
III.  BETTER  MEASURES  OF EFFICIENCY CHANGES
All  of the  above  is  very suggestive,  but it  glosses  over  two  types
of  measurement  problems. The  first  is  that  table  2 is limited  to single
factor  productivities.  Accordingly,  it  does  not  allow  us to  measure
overall  productivity  of the  input bundle, or  to distinguish  between  scale
effects  and  X-efficiency effects.  The  second problem  concerns  data
quality. Value-added  and  capital stock figu  -es  are likely  to  be biased
because of  inflation-distorted  bookkeeping.  Moreover, even without
inflation,  book  values  of capital stocks  reflect  historic  cost  rather  than
economic  worth,  and  the  discrepancy  in  values  should increase  as the
capital  ages.  Finally, for many  enterprises  capital  stock  figures  are
missing  entirely. This section  presents an  attempt  to come to grips  with
all  of these  shortcomings.
A.  Indices  Of Scale  and  Technical  Efficiency
First,  by  going  to  a  parametric representation  of  production
technologies,  we  can  easily construct better measures  of  efficiency.
Assume  that  intermediate inputs are  used  in  fixed proportion  to gross
output,  and let  the  maximum value-added  attainable  with given  amounts  of
capital  (K*) and  labor  (E) be  represented  by  the  production  function
f(K*  ,E).  Then  returns  to scale are  simply  the  sum  of the  elasticities  of
f( )  with respect  to its  arguments.  If  this  sum  exceeds  one for  a given
vector of  inputs, the  associated  plant  is  said  suffer from scale
inefficiency. Also,  if  the  ith  plant  is  using  inputs  (K*i,Ei)  and
producing  value  added  Vi, then ei  =  f(K*i,Ei) - Vi  is  an index  of  the12
plant's  level  of technical  inefficiency. 11
Our  objective is  infer something about  the  changes in these
efficiency  measures that  accompany  trade  liberalization.  Ignoring
econometric  and  data  problems  for  the  moment,  imagine  we are  able  to obtain
consistent  estimates  of the  following  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  for
each  industry  and  year:
(1)  V - aK  +  Po  + PIE +  f 2D1 +  P3D2 +  P4D3 +u 1
Here  D1 through  D3 are  dummies  that  control  for  things  like  type  of firm
ownership,  ul is  a disturbance  term,  and  all  other  variables  are  assumed
to be  measured  in logarithms.  (More  detailed  variable  definitions  are
provided in  the  appendix.)  Then  inferences regarding scale and
technical  efficiency can  be  based  on  estimates of  a,  Po.  P1.  and
var(ul).
To see  how,  refer  to  figure 1.  Here  we represent  f(K*,E)
indirectly  with its  dual,  the  technically  efficient  cost  function  g(V).
This  allows us  to work  in  two  dimensions.  All  variables  are  in
logarithms,  so  l/g'(V)  reflects  returns to  scale,  and  gt ) follows  the
usual  pattern  of increasing  returns in low  output  ranges,  then  constant
or diminishing returns.  Dots  and  asterisks are  hypothetical  data
points;  they  represent cross-sectional  observations  on  plants in  a
givenindustry.  All data points  lie  above  g(V) to indicate  that  the
11/  This  definition,  which  began  with the  work of Farrell  (1957),  is  fairly
standard  for  empirical work.  For  literature surveys,  see  Forsund,
Lovell  and Schmidt  (1980)  and  Schmidt  (1985).FIGURE  1
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associated  plants  are  not  operating at  maximum  technical  efficiency.  12
Assuming that  deviations from the  efficient technology are  Hicks-
neutral,  the  horizontal distance from  the  cost  function  for  the  ith
plant  is  a  monotonic positive function of its  technical  inefficiency
level,  ei.
Suppose  that  trade  liberalization  forces some plants  in  the
increasing  returns  region  to expand-  or exit  the  market,  eliminating  the
data  points  represented  by  asterisks in  figure 1.  Then  Cobb-Douglas
estimates  of the  returns to  scale  (a+P 1)  are  likely  to fall,  as the
"before"  and "after"  regression  lines  make  clear. 13 The  cost  function
intercept  is  also  likely to  fall, or  equivalently,  the  production
function  intercept  (Po)  is  likely to  rise.  Finally,  given  that  the
Cobb-Douglas  technology  implies  a  log-linear  relationship  between  costs
and  output,  it should  fit  the  data  better  after  plants  in the  increasing
returns  range  have  been  eliminated.  So  the  variance  in  ul (C 1
2) is
likely  to drop with  trade liberalization  unless  offseting  changes  in
measurement  error  occur.
12/  With  measurement  error  in  value  added, some  observed  data  points
might  fall  below  the  cost  function.  Measurement  error  does  not
alter  the  analysis  unless its variance  changes  across  census  years
in a  way that  is  correlated  with  changes  in protection  rates.  We
assume  this  does  not  occur.
13/  Returns  to scale  estimates  should fall  for  the  estimated  production
function  as  well  as  the  estimated cost  function, since  cost  is
simply  an index  of factor  usage. Interpreted  this  way, figure  1  may
be viewed  as representing  the  inverse  production  function.15
There  is  another  reason  that  012  may fall  and (Po)  may rise  as
efficiency improves.  Imagine that heightened exposure to foreign
competition  forces  all  plants to  move toward  the  efficient  technology,
so that  the  data  points  in figure  1 drift  to the  right,  and  cluster  more
closely  above  the  efficient  cost  function. Then  the residual  variation
and  the  intercept  of  the  estimated cost  function  would  fall. 14 These
effects  can  occur  without  any  change in the  estimated  returns  to scale,
so by examining  the  changes in Po,  012,  and  a+f 2 together,  we may  be
able  to learn  something  about  the  relative  importance  of scale  effects
versus  technical  efficiency  effects.
B.  Dealing  with Imperfect  Data
Problems  of  missing  data  and measurement  error  complicate  the
analysis. As mentioned  above, capital stock  figures  do  not  accurately
reflect  true  stocks,  and  for  many  plants  they  are  missing  entirely. We
deal  with these  problems  by employing  an estimator  that  combines  errors-
in-variables  techniques  developed  by Goldberger  (1972)  with missing  data
treatments  exposited  in  Gourieroux and  Monfort  (1981). This  estimator
provides maximum likelihood estimates for  equation (1), given  the
following  relationships  (Tybout,  1990):
14/  Much of the  micro-econometric  literature  on efficiency  measurement
is  devoted  to capturing  these  two  effects  (e.g.,  Schmidt,  1985). We
depart  from  this  literature somewhat because of the  data  problems
discussed  in  the following  subsection.16
(2)  K  7Z+  6  +6E+  6D  +  6 D  + 6  D  +  u 0  1  2  1  3  2  4  3  2
(3)  K  =K  +  u3
Here  K is  book  value  of capital  stock,  which  differs  from  the  true stock
by the  measurement  error  u3, and  is missing  entirely  for  a fraction  of
the  sample. Also Z is an instrument  for  the  true  capital  stock (see  the
appendix  for  details). When  estimating the  system  (1)  through  (3),  we
assume  that  all  disturbances  are  independent  of one  another,  and labor
and  capital  are  exogenous. 15 Also, we  assume that  the  missing  data
pattern  is "ignorable"  (e.g.,  Little, 1982), and  hence  does  not  create
selectivity  bias. 16
15/  This  exogeneity assumption is  justifiable  if  firms  choose  input
levels  before  observing  current period shocks  to technology  and  to
real  input  prices  (e.g., Zellner, Kmenta, and  Dreze,  1966). This
condition  seems  to  suit  1967 particularly  well,  given  that labor
laws were  very  strict,  and  labor dismissal was  difficult.
Nonetheless,  we  experimented  with  an  alternative  version  of the
model  in  which  it  was  assumed that  firms  observe  current  period
wages  without  error  and  freely adjust  employment  levels  to  maximize
short-run  profits.  This  extension yielded  implausible  results,
suggesting  the  approach taken here  is  a  closer  approximation  to
behavior.
16/  This  assumption  can  be relaxed  (Tybout,  1990). However,  experiments
in  which  we did  so  suggested that  selectivity  bias  was  minimal,  so
we opted  for  the  simpler  estimator.17
C.  The  Estimated  Effect  of Trade  Reforms  on  Productive  Efficiency
Estimates  of the  system  (1) through (3)  for  each industry  and
year  are  presented  and  discussed  in  appendix 1.  We use  the results  to
construct  industry-specific  indices  of the  changes  in  returns  to scale,
average  efficiency level  (i.e., production function intercept),  and
dispersion  in  efficiency  levels between 1967 and  1979.  For  the  jth
industry  (j=l,  21),  these  measures  are:
SCALES  a  [ajP 1 j  (  j+  lj )79  1 (j+  'l  )67
EFFICj =[POj  )79  /[PoJ  )67
DISPER.  =  (  )79 / (l  )67
Here  hats indicate estimated values, and  subscripts  outside  brackets
refer  to the  year  of the  census  from  which  the  estimates  were  obtained.
As with our  descriptive statistics of  section  II.C,  these  indices  are
relatively robust with  respect to  industry-specific  distortions  in
estimators. Such  distortions  will not  matter  if  they  bias  estimators  by
the  same  factor  in  each year,  or (when  comparing  across  industries)  if
the  factor  of bias  is  common  to all industries.
The  top  panel  of  Table  3  presents estimated  values  for  each
parameter  ratio  of interest,  industry  by industry,  along  with associated
PROTEC  values. As in  table 1,  there  is  still  no evidence  of overall
improvements  in  productive  efficiency  for  the  manufacturing  sector. Of
the  21  manufacturing  industries analyzed, only  10 showed  reductions  in
estimated  returns  to  scale, only  9  showed evidence  of Hicks  neutral18
productivity  improvements,  and  only  5 registered  reductions  in  our index
of efficiency  dispersion.
Recall, however, that many macro  shocks hit  the  Chilean
manufacturing  sector  between  the  census years, masking  the  effects  of
commercial  policy  in sector-wide  analyses.  Therefore,  to isolate  the
influence of  trade  reforms from  shocks that  are  common to  all
industries,  we once  again  turn to  cross-industry  comparisons.  Spearman
rank  correlations  and  t ratios  for  PROTEC,  SCALE,  EFFIC,  and  DISPER  are
reported  in  the  bottom  panel  of  table 3.  Here  notice  that  relatively
large  reductions  in  protection are  associated  with relatively  marked
declines  in the  estimated  returns to  scale. Although  this  association
is statistically  weak, it  builds  on our  table  2 findings. There  we saw
that  small  plants  tend  to  drop out  or  grow  as  protection  is removed;
here  we find  evidence  that  this  process  generates  some  efficiency  gains.
More  strikingly, the  intercept of  the  production  function
appears  strongly  negatively  associated  with  the  level  of  protection,  as
does  the  dispersion in  output levels conditioned on  inputs. These
correlations  are  partly  due  to  a  flattening  of the  regression  line,  as
the  correlation  between  SCALE  and  EFFIC  makes  clear. 17 However,  SCALE
does  not  correlate  as  strongly with  reductions in protection  as does
EFFIC,  so  we are tempted  to conclude  that such  reductions  are  associated
with  movements  toward  the  efficient technology across  a  wide range  of
17/  Even  when  the  underlying population remains unchanged,  sampling
error  is  likely to  induce a  negative correlation between  the
intercept  and  the  sum  of  the  slope  coefficients,  so  we caution
against  reading too  much  into  the  high  t  ratio for  the  rank
correlation  of SCALE  and  EFFIC.19
Table 3:  VALUES AND RANK CORRELATIONS OF
PROTEC, SCALE, EFFIC and DISPER
Estimated Parameter Ratios
Industry  PROTEC SCALE  EFFIC  DISPER
food  .24  .97  1.89
beverages  1.47  1.02  1.06  1.46
textiles  .19  1.01  1.14  2.44
apparel  .98  .95  1.02  2.21
leather products  .96  .99  .54  3.10
footwear  1.01  .99  .83  4.10
wood and cork  1.13  1.26  .53  2.86
wood furniture  1.11  1.18  .76  2.10
pulp and paper  .60  1.18  .24  .90
printing  1.31  1.00  .91  3.13
indus. chemicals  .69  .98  .94  1.61
other chemicals  .95  1.17  .81  2.33
rubber products  .28  1.04  3.66  .98
plastic products  .50  .88  1.41  2.06
glass*  .03  .72  1.49  1.19
non-metal minerals  1.13  1.13  .65  3.41
iron and steel  .87  .79  1.14  2.04
metal products  .60  1.08  .85  2.72
non-elec. mach.  .64  .92  1.42  .94
elec. mach.  .20  .90  1.72  .94
transport equip.  .39  1.06  .77  .99
Spearman Rank Correlationsi*
SCALE  EFFIC  DISPER
PROTEC  .387  -.523  .546
(1.83)  (-2.68)  (2.85)




*  This  industry  exhibited  such  ar. extreme  reduction  in measured
protection that  we  redid  the  analysis  without  it.  None of the
results (available  on request)  were significantly affected.
**  t ratios are in parentheses20
plant  sizes. That  is,  the  apparent  changes  in  overall  eificiency  were
probably not  exclusively  attributable to  small  inefficient  plants
expanding  or dropping  out.
Taken  together,  the  rank corelations in  table  3  are  wholly
consistent  with the  table  2  finding  that  industries  undergoing  the  most
reduction  in protection  showed  the  most productivity  improvement.  They
also  appear  to confirm  the  adjustment  processes  discussed  in  connection
with  figure 1.  Nonetheless,  there  are  alternative plausible
explanations for  our  findings.  Consider the  scale  result  first.
Changes  in  returns  to  scale are  negatively  associated  with changes  in
average  plant  size  across  the  two  censuses, as one  would  expect. 18 So
it  appears that expansions in  plant  size do  partly account for
reductions  in estimated  returns  to scale. But  other  factors  may also  be
at  work.  Specifically,  our  data  deflation  is  based  on the  presumption
that  products  are  homogeneous  at  the  3-digit  level. This  is obviously
unlikely,  and  could  lead  to  misinterpretations.  That  is,  when  value
added  is  deflated by  an  industry price  deflator, we are  not really
isolating  a  physical  quantity, even  if  intermediate  inputs  are  always
used in  fixed proportion to  output.  This means  that  if big  firms
achieve  larger  mark-ups  because of  market power, they  will appear  to
have  more output  per  unit  input  --  that  is,  they  will appear  more scale
efficient. Moreover,  if reductions in  protection  force  these  firms  to
price  competitively,  it  will  appear that  returns to  scale  in  the
18/  The  rank  correlation  between average plant  size  changes  and scale
changes is about -.30.21
industry  have decreased. 19 This  is  surely  a result  in  favor  of trade
liberalization,  but  not  the  one  we have stressed.
Several  alternative  explanations also ccme  to  mind for  the
technical  efficiency  findings.  For  example,  the  positive  correlation
between  PROTEC  and  DISPER  might  have  been  generated  by a reduction  in
product diversity  within  certain 3-digit industries,  making  intra-
industry  technology  more  uniform  across  plants. This,  too,  would  reduce
observed deviations from  the  estimated  technology.  As  for  the
association  between  PROTEC  and  EFFIC,  it  might  reflect  a downward  shift
of  the  efficient cost  functiz-n for  industries  exposed to  world
competition. If this explains table  3,  dispersion  about  the  average
isoquant  need  not  have fallen most  in the  industries  with the  greatest
average  efficiency  improvement.  Given  that  the  rank  correlation  between
DISPER  and  EFFIC  is  only  -. 13  (t=-.55), this interpretation  of the
results  appears  to  have some  merit.
Finally,  despite  our  very  encouraging  findings,  it should  be
stressed  that  they  reflect a  number of  somewhat  arbitrary  decisions
regarding  data  preparation  and  model  specification. First,  there  was
some  specification  search involved in  choosing the  capital stock
instrument. Initially  electricity  consumed  was  used,  and  when it  became
clear  that  this  led  to  very  inaccurate estimates,  we  switched  to
19/  Using  the  same  data,  de Melo  and  Urata  (1986)  found  that  price-cost
margins  decreased slightly between the  two  census years.  They
attribute  this  to  increased  competitive  pressures  from
liberalization.22
machinery  and  equipment. 20 Second, our  protection  estimates  for  1967
are  crude.  Third, with  respect to  specification,  it must also  be
recognized  that our  crude measure of  labor  input  is  probably  not
strictly  exogenous. So if labor  usage  depends  on  output  demand  and  some
omitted variables --  e.g. the wage-price ratio --  changes in  the omitted
variable  can  change  the  estimated  relationship  between  labor  and  output.
(Changes  in  the structure  of protection  alter  the  cross-sectoral  pattern
of  wage-price  ratios,  and  hence  in  principle  could  change  the  apparent
pattern  of scale  economies.)
About these  shortcomings  little  could  be done.  However,  we did
test  for  robustness  by trying  alternative  variable  definitions  and  model
specifications.  With  respect to  data,  we  experimented  with  two
alternative  industry-specific  deflators  for  gross  output  and  found  that
our results  were  robust to  the  selection of industry-specific  gross
output  deflator  (results  available  upon request).  We also  developed  an
extension  of the  model  treating labor  as  endogenous  (see  footnote  15).
Unfortunately,  this  yielded implausibly  low  estimates for  returns  to
scale,  probably reflecting  problems with  our wage  variable  and  the
imposition  of too  much  structure  on the  data.2 1
20/  However,  tests  for  the  association  between  protection  and  efficiency
were not  performed  until  we  had  settled  on  our instrument,  nor did
we even  compare results from the  two  census  years  industry-by-
industry. Hence  our  search in  itself did  not  bias  the  results  in
favor  of our  priors.
21/  Os'r  data  do not specify  location  of establishments,  so  we are  unable
to  control  for  the  possibility that  firms  in  different  localities
may face  different  wage-price  ratios.23
IV.  CONCLUDING  REHMRXS
This  paper  provides new  micro  evidence on the  relationship
between choice  of  development  strategy  and  industrial sector
performance.  Our contribution  departs from  the  existing  literature  in
several  respects. First,  unlike virtually all  other  evidence,  ours  is
at the  establishment  level.  Thus we  are  able  to address  theories  of
intra-industry  adjustment  much  more  directly than  has  been  possible  in
the  past.  Second, there  is  dramatic variation in the  trade  regime
between  our sample  years.  This  gives our  analysis  a laboratory-like
flavor,  and  creates  sufficiently  large  changes  in  industrial  performance
to be detectible  despite  measurement  problems. Finally,  unlike  much of
the  literature, our  study tracks a  single country through time,
eliminating  the  complicating  influence  of country-specific  effects.
Although  the  findings are  suggestive,  much  more  plant-level
work  must  be done  before we  can  be  confident  of the "stylized  facts"
regarding  intra-industry  adjustments  to  trade  reforms. We are  currently
attempting to  generate  further  evidence by  analyzing additional
liberalization  episodes and  by  exploiting panel  data  that  follow
individual  plants  through  time.24
Appendix  1:  Production  TechnoloRy  Estimates
This  appendix  presents  more  detail on our  estimates  of equations
(1)  through  (3)  of the  text.
A.  Variable  Definitions
The  variables  we used to  estimate  these  equations  are  presented  in
table  Al.  We  call  the  reader's attention to  several  details. First,
following  Maddala  (1977)  we use  a size dummy  (D 3) as an instrument  for  the
capital  stock. This  dummy  also  appears in  the  production  function  (1)
because  imposing  an  exclusion restriction  would  have  vastly  complicated
estimation  (Tybout,  1990). Empirically,  coefficients  on  D3 in  equation  (1)
are  all  very  close  to  zero,  so  the  only cost  of proceeding  this  way is
apparently  a small  loss  of power.
Second,  notice  that  Z,  which  serves  as another  instrument  for  the
true  capital stock, is  defined to  be  machinery and  equipment. This
reflects  several  considerations.  One  is  that  machinery  and  equipment  are
almost  always  reported. 22 (When total capital  is  missing,  it is  usually
because  firms  have rented  their  buildings,  land,  or vehicles.)
22/  This  is less  true  in 1979 than  in 1967. Obviously,  observations  that
do not  include machinery and  equipment must  be  excluded  from  the
estimation  altogether. Details of  our  data  preparation  are  available
upon  request.25
Table  A!:  VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS  FOR  SECTION  III  ESTIMATES
V  =  logarithm  of  value  added  corrected  for  inflation  distortions  and
expressed  in  1979  prices
E =  logarithm  of labor,  expressed  in  efficiency  units 23
Dl =  1 if  the  firm  is  a proprietorship,  0  otherwise
D2 =  1 if  the  firm  is  a partnership,  0 otherwise 24
D3 =  -1 if t1.1.  firm is among the smallest third of the industry sample;
0 if  the  firm  is  among  the  middle  third  of the  industry  sample;  and
1 if  the  firm  is  among  the  largest  third  of the  industry sample
K  =  logarithm of  the  reported value  of  the  capital  stock,  i.e.,
machinery  and  equipment plus  vehicles, plus  land  and  buildings.
(This  variable  is  considered "missing" if  at least  one  component
takes  a zero  or  missing  value.)
Z  =  logarithm  of  machinery  and  equipment
The  other  consideration  is that  the  instrument  Z should  be correlated  with
true  capital,  but  not  with the  measurement  error  u2. If  measurement  error
23/  This  rariable  is  constructed  as the  wage  bill  divided  by the  minimum
wage.  The  wage  bill  includes an  imputation  for  owners  and  family
help.  See  Griliches and  Ringstad for  a  similar  definition. In
earlier work  (Corbo  and  deMelo,  1985),  we  tested several
specifications  of the  labor variable to  deal  with  heterogeneity  in
the  labor  force  and  found  that  labor input  measured  by the  total
number  of unskilled  equivalent  workers  was the  best.
24/  Partnerships  could  not  be  distinguished  in  the  1967  data,  so  all
firms  with  between  1  and  10  owners  were considered  partnerships  in
that  year.26
in  capital  is essentially  due  to the  longer  term  items  --  i.e.,  buildings
and land  --  machinery  and  equipment  satisfy  this  condition. 25
B.  Parameter  Estimates
Table  A2 reports estimated output elasticities  with respect  to
capital(a) and  labor  (P1), their  sum (a+pl),  the  intercept (Po), and
2  2  2 estimates  for  aOl,  a2 and  a3  To give  some  sense  for  the  overall  fit,  we
2  2 include  total  variation  in  V (a2)  for  comparison  with  al.  Numbers  in
parentheses  are asymtotic "z'  ratios for  the  null  hypothesis  that  the
coefficient  estimated  immediately  above  is  zero  except in  the  case  of
returns  to scale, where  the  null  is  that  returns to scale  are  unity.
Finally,  the  number  of  observations  used  for  each  industry  (n)  and  the
number  for  which capital  stocks  are  observable  (nc)  are  also  reported.
Observe first that  the  scale estimates are  generally very
plausible,  although  the  labor coefficient is  sometimes larger  than  one
would  expect.  We  found that  although the  scale estimate a+pl  was
insensitive  to the instrument  (Z)  used,  choice  of instrument  did  affect  the
breakdown  of returns  to scale between a  and Pl.  So,  although  the  scale
estimates  seem  robust,  these  individual  magnitudes should  be viewed  with
some  caution.
Note  next  that  the  estimated  variances of  ul  are  always
significantly  positive, while  those  of  u2 and  u3 sometimes are  not.
25/  We also tried  electricity  consumption  as an instrument  for  capital  but
found  it  had  low  predictive power.  (It was  also  unattractive
conceptually because electricity is  subject to  relatively severe
endogeneity  problems.)  Installed horsepower was  an alternative  to
machinery  and  equipment,  but  this variable was only  available  in the
1967  census.27
Table  A2:  INDUSTRY-WIDE PROWUCTION  TEfCFLOCIES  1967  VS.  1979
RETURNS
INTERCEPT  CAPITAL  LABOR  TO SCALE
INDUSTRY/DESCRIPTION  YEAR  n/nc  fGi  1  02  02  02  02  r  fi
1  2  3  I
312  FOOD PRODUCTS  67  1543/  2.802  0.345  0.645  0.428  0.200  0.060  2.26  0.990
801  (15.48)  (11.89)  (16.36)  (23.36)  (5.09)  (1.62)  (-0.35)
79  1880/  2.720  0.329  0.632  0.808  0.124  0.104  2.90  0.961
696  (15.12)  (11.77)  (15.03)  (28.96)  (2.41)  (2.03)  (-1.27)
313  8EVRAOES  67  429/  2.383  0.389  0.682  0.806  0.248  -0.048  2.57  1.071
122  (3.98)  (5.10)  (9.64)  (12.58)  (2.39)  (-0.49)  (1.00)
79  138/  2.521  0.315  0.783  1.179  0.049  0.166  4.18  1.098
74  (2.66)  (2.66)  (4.37)  (8.17)  (0.26)  (0.87)  (0.69)
321  TEXTILES  67  666/  3.191  0.332  0.611  0.318  -0.025  0.197  2.23  0.943
271  (11.40)  (7.75)  (12.64)  (17.90)  (-0.60)  (4.36)  (-1.69)
79  657/  3.6a5  0.133  0.819  0.775  0.329  -0.218  3.17  0.953
216  (12.39)  (3.23)  (12.22)  (17.74)  (2.16)  (-1.45)  (-0.91)
322  WEARINO  APPAREL  67  582/  2.569  0.504  0.613  0.413  -0.075  0.284  1.94  1.118
104  (4.12)  (5.13)  (7.28)  (15.59)  (-1.49)  (4.55)  (1.77)
79  621/  2.610  0.268  0.791  0.912  0.453  -0.243  2.74  1.059
149  (6.36)  (4.04)  (9.30)  (15.47)  (3.16)  (-1.80)  (0.93)
323  LEATHER PRODUCTS  67  128/  4.693  0.163  0.698  0.245  -0.09  0.316  2.06  0.861
56  (6.57)  (1.43)  (6.45)  (8.01)  (-0.54)  (1.64)  (-1.71)
79  109/  2.531  0.483  0.364  0.760  -0.070  0.200  2.86  0.847
49  (3.47)  (4.19)  (1.69)  (7.49)  (-0.72)  (1.89)  (-1.08)
324  FOOTWEAR  67  323/  3.385  0.260  0.738  0.297  0.147  0.104  2.14  0.998
81  (9.22)  (3.72)  (9.57)  (11.02)  (1.16)  (0.84)  (-0.05)
79  2661/  2.826  0.200  0.794  1.219  0.221  -0.061  3.34  0.994
67  (4.09)  (1.78)  (5.44)  (11.25)  (0.74)  (-0.21)  (-0.06)
331 SAWMILLS, WOOD  67  732/  5.143  0.206  0.636  0.389  0.160  0.148  1.71  0.842
A CORK  266  (18.46)  (4.62)  (12.20)  (17.88)  (1.50)  (1.38)  (-4.11)
79  502/  2.737  0.210  0.847  1.116  0.278  0.083  3.34  1.058
196  (6.04)  (2.90)  (8.18)  (15.25)  (1.26)  (0.38)  (0.79)
332 WOOD  ftRNITLRE  67  416/  4.041  0.194  0.714  0.375  0.539  -0.161  1.64  0.908
108  (12.80)  (3.24)  (9.49)  (11.44)  (2.58)  (-0.83)  (-1.78)
79  368/  3.063  0.162  0.908  0.789  0.651  -0.222  2.45  1.070
93  (6.99)  (2.22)  (8.77)  (12.41)  (1.67)  (-0.59)  (0.90)
341  PULP  AND PAPER  67  39/  3.997  0.303  0.579  0.308  0.151  0.065  3.77  0.882
24  (4.46)  (2.36)  (3.38)  (3.88)  (0.77)  (0.35)  (-1.04)
79  68/  0.978  0.623  0.417  0.277  0.372  -0.017  4.95  1.040
29  (1.36)  (5.08)  (2.34)  (1.25)  (0.96)  (-0.14)  (0.39)
342  PRINTING  67  302/  3.928  0.413  0.530  0.207  0.110  0.091  1.97  0.943
76  (11.87)  (7  62)  (7.27)  (8.59)  (1.57)  (1.38)  (-1.12)
79  388/  3  555  0.183  0.755  0.649  0.240  -0.129  2.43  0.938
106  (11.85)  (3.94)  (10.34)  (13.47)  (1.65)  (-0.90)  (-1.13)
351  CHEMICALS  67  81/  4.578  0.227  0.642  0.507  -0.348  0.487  2.55  0.869
(INDUSTRIAL)  45  (E.47)  (2.21)  (4.44)  (6.65)  (-2.17)  (2.79)  (-1.12)
79  S1/  4.303  0.309  0.542  0.817  0.247  -0.150  Z.00  0.851
24  (4.10)  (2.58)  (2.32)  (4.71)  (1.24)  (-0.79)  (-0.81)
352  OTHER CHEMICALS  67  206/  3.841  '.  478  0.335  0.352  0.074  0.178  2.35  0.813
109  (5.95)  (4.98)  (3.30)  (8.44)  (1.10)  (2.55)  (-2.54)
79  188/  3.120  0.343  0.606  0.820  0.321  -0.105  4.30  0.948
112  (4.84)  (4.10)  (4.71)  (8.55)  (2.45)  (-0.86)  (-0.S1j
335 RU88ER PRODUCTS  67  61/  0.925  0.784  0.176  0.564  -0.175  0.586  3.15  0.960
31  (0.52)  (2.82)  (0.59)  (5.51)  (-2.48)  (4.22)  (-0.22)
79  83/  3.128  0.240  0.761  0.552  -0.336  0.501  3.32  1.001
39  (4.04)  (1.79)  (4.14)  (6.64)  (-1.82)  (2.49)  (0.01)
356  PLASTIC  PRODUCTS  67  100/  3.122  0.257  0.817  0  291  -0.229  0.486  2.16  1.074
39  (4.47)  (3  16)  (6.98)  (7.39)  (-1.54)  (2.79)  (0.70)
79  185/  4.398  0.025  0  914  0  601  -1 167  1.537  2.34  0.938
64  (6.38)  (0.24)  (7  06)  (9.59)  (-0.49)  (0.64)  (-0.69)28
Tabi  A2:  INDTRY-WIDE  PROCUCTION  TECNOLOXIES  1967  VS.  1979  (continued)
RETURNS
NTECEPT  CAPITAL  LABM  TO SCALE
I?VJSTRY/DEmsmIPTIm  YEAR  n/nc  A)u  0r2  022  02  02  a
1  2  3a
362  CLASS  67  S1/  2.726  0.35?  0.703  0.489  0.085  0.113  3.67  1.060
27  (2.10)  (1.84)  (3.35)  (4.69)  (0.48)  (0.6A)  (0.38)
79  37/  4.072  0.349  0.416  O.S85  0.048  0.330  3.91  0.764
17  (2.80)  (1.66)  (1.62)  (4.  .4)  (0.14)  (0.93)  (-1.26)
369  NON-METALLIC  67  146/  3.105  0.305  0.708  0.261  0.284  0.119  2.17  1.013
MINERAL PRODUCTS  67  (7.29)  (4.55)  (6.82)  (8.16)  (1.70)  (0.79)  (0.18)
79  152/  2.024  0.243  0.898  0.891  -0.049  0.294  4.41  1.142
43  (3.57)  (2.57)  (5.87)  (8.65)  (-0.17)  (0.99)  (1.40)
371  IRON  AND STEEL  67  52/  2.624  0.449  0.619  0.301  0.030  0.081  2.82  1.068
28  (2.84)  (4.71)  (4.66)  (4.73)  (0.37)  (0.98)  (0.52)
79  41/  2.997  0.463  0.387  0.618  0.363  -0.122  4.26  0.850
18  (2.49)  (2.58)  (1.60)  (3.14)  (1.35)  (-0.57)  (-0.69)
381  MErAL PRODUCTS  6:  636/  4.136  0.206  0.702  0.290  0.467  -0.207  2.33  0.908
238  (1S.98)  (5.12)  (14.85)  (13.93)  (4.59)  (-2.31)  (-2.63)
79  625/  3.505  0.124  0.866  0.789  0.266  -0.077  3.23  0.991
224  (10.40)  (2.49)  (12.76)  (17.40)  (1.27)  (-0.57)  (-0.18)
382 NON-ELECTRICAL  67  289/  2.705  0.063  0.905  0.903  -0.249  0.484  3.20  (1.967
MACHINERY  99  (4.35)  (0.71)  (7.94)  (12.03)  (-0.34)  (0.66)  (-0.36)
79  173/  3.840  0.259  0.633  0.  84  -0.043  0.156  2.89  0.893
71  (5.62)  (3.02)  (4.65)  (9.31)  (-0.30)  (1.09)  (-0.90)
383 ELECTRICAL  67  g5/  2.183  0.287  0.826  0.717  0.135  0.013  3.61  1.113
MACHINERY  45  (2.45)  (2.46)  (S.14)  (6.60)  (0.77)  (0.07)  (0.81)3
79  76/  3.746  0.066  0.934  0.673  1.576  -1.429  3.39  1.000
46  (3.79)  (0.45)  (4.57)  (5°83)  (2.19)  (-2.05)  (-0.00)
38A TRANSPORT  67  184/  4.403  0.266  0.717  0.623  -0.012  0.159  3.00  0.983
EQUIPME?B'T  76  (7.45)  (3.40)  (6.91)  (9.52)  (-0.09)  (1.20)  (-0.20)
79  164/  3.376  0.115  0.927  0.616  0.257  -0.012  2.75  1.041
65  (6.40)  (1.75)  (8.25)  (8.91)  (0.60)  (-0.03)  (0.45)29
However,  for  these  latter two  disturbances,  only  3  out  of 84 estimated
variances  are  significantly  negative  at  the  95  percent  level. 26 This  gives
us some  degree  of confidence  that  our  model  is  reasonably  specified,  and  we
take  these  variance estimates to  shed  some light on the  importance  of
capital  stock  measurement  error.  In  particular,  we observe  that  all  but
six  sectors  showed  reductions  in  the  amount  of  measurement  error  from  1967
to 1979,  perhaps  reflecting  the  fact that  firms  were instructed  to adjust
their  book  va.,ues  to  market  worth in  the  latter  year. 27
26/  Negative variance estiamtes could  in principle be  eliminated by
restricting  the  parameter space when  we  maximize the  likelihood
function,  bat  this would  vastly complicate the  calculations. (See
Tybout  (1990)  for  details.) Given  that the  variances  of u2 and  u3 are
nusiance  parameters  with  little bearing on  our  analysis,  we do  not
grapple  with  this  problem.
27/  This  one-time  revaluation  was  termed  the  'Retacacion  Tecnica",  or
.technical  adjustment".30
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Appendix  2:  Data  Preparation  Procedures
This  document  describes  the  data  preparation  steps  in  the  order  in
which  they  were done.  The  preparation  began  with corrections  for  inflation
bias. Next  we  excluded some industries  that  appeared  too  heterogeneous
from  a technological  point  of  view  and  grouped  the  census  establishment-
level  data  according to  the  3-digit ISIC  classification.  Finally  we
applied  some  exclusion  criteria  for  errors  in  data recording. The  appendix
closes  with a discussion  of  how  ERP  estimates  were obtained  for  each  census
year.
1.  Correction  for  Inflation  Bias
Two  corrections  for  inflation  bias were performed: within  census
years  and  between  census  years.  Within  census  years.  we first  brought  all
establishments  accounts  to the  same closing dates  to remove  biases  due  to
inflation  (about  60Z in  each  census year). This  was a relatively  involved
process  for  value-added,  because  firms construct  the  value  of their  output
as final  inventories  plus  sales, minus  initial inventories.  So  when
inflation  causes  the  value  of  inventories  to  grow  over the  course  of the
year,  the  value  of production  is  overstated  (e.g.,  Tybout,  1988). We  undid
this  bias  by stating  initial  and  final  inventories  in  mid-year  prices,  then
reconstructirg  the  value  of output  using  the  corrected  inventory  figures. 27
Finally,  we  deleted establishments  whose  accounts  covered  less
than  12  months,  thereby  losing  2Z of the  observations  in 1967  and  less  than
1Z for  1979.
27/  For  this  exercise  we assumed  that firms  all  use the 'weighted  average"
inventory  valuation convention.  This  assumption was  supported  by
conversations  with Chilean  accountants.33
Second,  we brought the  1967 census data  to  1979 prices. We
carried  out  a single-deflation  procedure for  value-added  relying  on gross
output deflators at  the  3  digit  ISIC  level, which  we  applied to
intermediate  inputs  using  weights  from the  1977  input-output  table. Value
added  in  1979  prices  was  thus obtained  as the  difference  between  deflated
gross  output  and  deflated intermediate  inputs.  For  capital  stocks,  we
deflated  the  different  components  of the  capital  stock  using  the  respective
flow  prices  LX the  national  accounts.
When  used  by  Mierau  (1986) for  a  study of  TEP  growth  for  the
Chilean  manufacturing  sector  at a  level  of  disaggregation  similar  to  ours,
the  wholesale  price  deflators published by  INE  often  yielded  relatively
high  variations  in sectoral  gross  output growth  rates. As an alternative
Mierau used  physical production indexes which  were  available for  17
industries  and  found  them  to  exhibit less extreme variations.  Where
available,  we used  these  indexes to  construct our  own  deflator  which  was
then  applied  to the  census  data.  As a third  alternative,  we constructed  a
price  index  based  on the  US  manufacturing  wholesale  price  index  using  the
tariff  structure  of 1975 (when QRs  were removed)  to  convert  the  wholesale
price  index  into  tariff  (and premium) inclusive  domestic  prices  for  1967,
and  1979  tariff  levels  for  1979. This  third  index  assumes  purchasing  power
parity. We carried  out  all  econometric  estimation  using  each  one  of these
three  deflators.
In general,  the  results on  the  returns  to scale  estimation  were
quite  robust  to the  choice of  deflator, a  reassuring  result. Table  Dl
reports  the  Spearman rank correlation coefficients  for  each  one  of the
three  deflators.  As can  be seen  the  correlation  patterns  for  DEF2  and  DEF3
are  very close  to  those  for  DEF1  which  are  reported  in the  main text. The34
Table Dl:  Spearman Bank Correlations with Alternative Deflators
Deflators a/  DEF1  DEF2  DEF3
Correlations  Glass b/
Protec,  (w)  0.39  0.35  -0.31
Scale  (1.86)  (1.61)  (-1.41)
(wlo)  0.30  0.24  -0.28
(1.32)  (1.06)  (-1.22)
Protec,  vw)  -0.51  -0.50  -0.48
Efficiency  (-2.61)  (-2.52)  (-2.39)
(w/o)  -0.45  -0.43  -0.43
(-2.11)  (-2.00)  (-2.00)
Protec,  (w)  0.54  0.44  0.58
Dispersion  (2.79)  (2.16)  (3.08)
(w/o)  0.51  0.38  0.53
(2.50)  (1.75)  (2.65)
a/  DEF1 = INE deflator (used in  main oody of paper).
DEF2  Deflator built from quantum index.  (See text).
DEF3 =  Purchasing Power Parity Index.  (See  text).
b/  Correlations refer to  with (w) and without (w/o) the glass
industry.
only exception  is  the  correlation  between  protection  and  scale which
changes sign  with DEF3.  This is  not surprising in  view of the way in which
DEF3 was constructed (use  of 1975 tariffs for 1967 to get premia estimates)
and the assumption of purchasing power parity.
2.  Exclusion of Industries and Aggregation Scheme
First we  excluded  from  our  sample  sectors  which appeared too
heterogeneous from a  technology  viewpoint  (e.g.  most industries falling
under the category  n.e.c.  "not  elsewhere  classified") and sectors  which35
could  not  be compared  across  both  censuses. The  excluded  industries  appear
in  Table  D2.  We  then aggregated the  remaining sectors  into  21 groups
according  to the  aggregation  scheme described in Appendix  Table  D3.  The
aggregation  criteria were:  (1) aggregated industries  must  display  a
similar  technology; (2) aggregated industries  must  belong  to the  same
sectoral trade orientation  (i.e.  non-tradables, import-competing  or
exportables).
The  first column of  Table  D3  gives  the  code used  for  our
aggregated  industry  classification  referred  to  as  a  group. The  next  two
columns  give the  number of  observations remaining  after  aggregation  and
prior  to the  application  of exclusion tests  described  below. The  name  of
the  aggregated  sectors  and  their  number  of observations  appear  on the right
hand side  columns.  Abbreviations  used  in  the  text  and  in subsequent
appendix  tables  are  in  parentheses.
3.  Exclusion  Criteria  for  Errors  in  Data  Recording
When  working  with  census  data,  it  is  necessary  to  chleck  the  data
for  errors  in  data  recording.  This  included applying  the  first  seven
exclusion  criteria  in  table  D4.  For  example,  we eliminated  establishments
which  had a non-positive  wage  bill (restriction  R3 in  Table  D4).  Likewise,
we eliminated  establishments  with less than  five  workers  since  the  census
is for  all  establishments  with five  workers or  more.  Restriction  Rl is to
exclude  establishments  that  operate  seasonally.
Next,  following  Griliches  and  Ringstad  (1971),  we excluded  firms
with capital/labor  and  material/labor  ratios  that were less  than  5Z of the
(weighted)  industry average (R8).  We  checked the  characteristics  of36
Table D2:  EXCLUDED INDUSTRIES
No. of
ISI  establishments
3 digit  Name of Industry  1967  1979  ISIC (4  digits)
314  Tobacco industries  4  5  3140  Tobacco industries
353  Petroleum refineries  11  11  3530  Petroleum refineries
354  Misc. products of  6  13  3540  Misc. products of
petroleum and coal  petroleum and coal
361  Pottery, china and  20  18  3610  Pottery, china and
earthenware  earthenware
372  Non-ferrous Metals  10  47  3721  Copper
3729  Non-ferrous basic
industries
385  Professional Equipment  35  22  3851  Professional
and Optical Goods
Equipment
3852  Optical goods
390  Other manufacturing  211  120  3901  Jewelry
industries
3902  Musical instruments
3903  Sporting and
athletic goods
3909  Manufacturing indus.37
Table D3:  AGGREGATION TO 3 DIGIT ISIC
No. of
ISIC  establishments 1
3 digit  1967  1979  Name of Industry  ISIC at 4 digits









3121  food n.e.c.
3122  animal food
313  1012  361  Beverages  3131  distillery
3132  wine
3133  malt liquors
3134  non-alcoholic bev.
321  789  821  Textiles  3211  spun fabrics
3212  textile goods
3213  knitting mills
3214  rugs & carpets
3215  cordage
3219  textiles n.e.c.
322  678  794  Wearing Apparel  3220  wearing apparel
323  167  150  Leather Products  3232  tanneries and
leather finishing
1/  Before deleting observations.38
Table D3:  AGGREGATION TO 3 DIGIT ISIC  (cont'd)
No. of
ISIC  establishments 1
3 digit  1967  1979  Name of Industry  ISIC at 4 digits
324  342  353  Footwear  3240  footwear
331  1521  862  Sawmills,  Wood and Cork  3311  sawmills
3312  wood
3319  woo:l  and cord prod.
n.e.c.
332  469  540  Wood Furniture  3320  wood furniture
341  86  98  Pulp and Paper  3411  pulp and paper
3412  paper bags and
carton boxes
3419  pulp, paper n.e.c.
342  379  480  Printing  3420  printing, pub.
351  102  83  Chemicals (industrial)  3511  basic inorganic
chemicals
3512  fertilizers
3513  synthetic resins,
plastics
3514  basic, ind. organic
chemicals
3521  paints
352  238  229  Other Chemicals  3522  drugs and medicine
3523  soaps
3539  chemicals, n.e.c.
1/  Before deleting observations.39
Table D3:  AGGREGATION TO 3 DIGIT ISIC  (cont'd)
No. of
ISIC  establishments 1
3 digit  1967  1979  Name of Industry  ISIC at 4 digits
355  77  98  Rubber Products  3551  tires
3559  rubber products
356  117  230  Plastic Products  3560  plastic products
362  60  50  Glass  3620  glass
369  243  291  Non-metallic Mineral  3691  structural clay
Products  products
3693  cement products
3696  yeso
3699  non-met. n.e.c.
371  60  80  Iron and Steel  3710  iron and steel
381  730  789  Metal Products  3811  cutlery
3812  furniture
3813  structural metal
products
3814  metal containers
3815  cable, wire
3819  metal prod. n.e.c.
1/  Before deleting observations.40
Table D3:  AGGREGATION TO 3 DIGIT ISIC  (cont'd)
No. of
ISIC  establishments 1
3 digit  1967  1979  Name of Industry  ISIC at 4 digits
382  347  246  Non-electrical  3822  agricultural
Machinery  machinery
3823  metal machinery
3824  special ind. mach.
3825  office machinery
3829  machinery n.e.c.
383  112  101  Electrical Machinery  3831  elec. ind. mach.
3832  radio, t.v.
3833  electrical
appliances
3839  elect. apparatus
n.e.c.
384  212  213  Transport Equipment  3841  ships
3842  railroad equip.
3843  motor vehicles
3844  motorcycle
3845  repairing of
aircraft




1/  Before deleting observations41
Table  D4:  EXCLUSION  CRITERIA  AND  NUMBER  OF  OBSERVATIONS  EXCLUDED
Observations  Excluded
Yoar  Year
Nam of  Variable  Restriction  Exclusion  Criteria  1967  1979
RI  Number  of  days  worked by
the  establishment  (ND)  ND  < 40  665  18
R2  Total  employment  (L)  L < 6  1207  0
R3  Bluo  collar  wages  and
fringe  benefits  (WLN 1)  WL1N  <  0  1  99
R4  Gross  vOluS  added  (VA)  VA <  0  26  260
R5  Gross  value  of
Production  (x)  x  <  0  1  7
RS  Gross  value  of
Production  Loes  than
Value  Added  x  <  VA  a  4
R7  For  1987  only  --
Negative  Value  Added
in  1979  Prices  7
R8  KST/L  .06  _XS  and  M/L  <  .06  _  1361  367
EL  EL
R9  machinery  and  equipment  missing  18  1467
or  less  than  10,000  pesos  KM <  10,000
RIO Incomplote  fiscal  year  188  664
Total  number  of  exclusions  3626  2866
Total  number  of  observations  2914  2861
excluded
Total  number  of  observations  7060  6771
included  in  the  somplo42
establishments  failing  this  test  and found many  of them  employed  less  than
ten  workers.  (Accordingly,  it  was  a  much  more important  exclusion  in the
1967  census.) This  exclusion  criterion  thus  aims  at purging  establishments
which  are  likely  to  have a  different  technology  because  they  are  primarily
engaged  in repair  activities.
Finally, in  a  third pass, we  excluded establishments  which
reported  a  value  for machinery and  equipment less  than  10,000  pesos,  or
roughly  $2,500  (Restriction  R9).  This  arbitrary  cut-off  point  was chosen
because  many establishments  reported  a  value  of  1 for  1979,  obviously  an
error  in reporting.  The  bulk  of  observations  lost were  in 1979. A
possible  explanation  is that  those  establishments  rented  their  equipment.
Table  D4 shows  the  number of observations  lost  by the  application
of each  criterion  and  the  number  of observations  lost  by the  application  of
each criterion  and  the  distribution  of  exclusions across  criteria. For
1967,  the  bulk  of exclusions  concentrated in  Rl and  R2 came  from  the  food
(312).  drinks  (313)  and  wood  (331) industries.  In 1979,  the  observations
were lost  because  of  negative value-added (R4)  and  missing  machinery  and
equipment. The  pattern  across industries  was fairly  even,  though  somewhat
more concentrated  in  industries 312-332 (due to  the  greater  number  of
establishments  in  that  group).  It  is  likely  that  negative  value-added
reflects  ongoing  adjustment  to the trade  reforms.
4.  Estimates  of Protection
For  1967,  implicit  tariffs  for  92  products  were gathered  by de la
Cuadra  through  interviews.  Since  these  are  based  on price  comparisons,  the
effects  of QRs  are included  in  these estimates  which  include  at least  one
representative  item  from  each  two-digit  SITC  division. These  estimates  are43
reported  in  Behrman  (1976,  table  A3).  In turn,  Behrman  took  an unweighted
arithmetic  average  of the  items  in  his  Table  A3 to produce  EPR estimates  at
the subsector  level  (Behrman,  table  5.3,  pp. 138-9). Whenever  possible,  we
applied  these  rates  to  our  aggregation scheme. The  following  sectors  were
not  covered  by Behrman  (table  5.3): Wearing  Apparel  (322);  Footwear  (324);
Industrial  Chemicals  (351); Other Chemicals (352); Plastics  (356). For
those  sectors  we reverted  to  the  disaggregated  data  in  Behrman  (table  A4)
taking  again  an unweighted arithmetic average of  protection  rates. This
still  left  us with  problems  for  industries 351,  352,  and  356.  For  356  we
aggregated  the  price  comparisons  on chemical  products  in  Behrman  Table  A4.
There  are  many  shortcomings  with  the  procedures  used.  To start
with,  the  price  comparisons  are  only  for  a  small  sample  of products.
However,  given  the  prevalence  of  non-tariff barriers  to trade  in Chile  in
1967,  this  selection  of  protection  estimates  is superior  to  the  alternative
based  on  nominal  tariffs  from  customs data  to  which  we would  have had  to
apply  a 1962  input-output  matrix  to  obtain  ERPs.  Second.  biases  of unknown
magnitude  are  introduced  by  using  unweighted  averages.
For  1979,  we relied on  the  estimates in  Aedo  and  Lagos  (1984).
For  sectors  for  which  no  protection estimates  were available  from  Aedo and
Lagos  we computed  ERPs  by  using  nominal  protection  rates  assuming  that  each
sector  paid  the  economy wide  average ERP  for  all  intermediates.  Since
there  were  no NTBs in  1979  and  tariffs  were very  uniform,  it is likely  that
our  measures  of  ERPs  are  relatively  accurate.44
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